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Property
Property; common interest developments
Civil Code § 1354 (amended).
AB 55 (Hauser); 1993 STAT. Ch. 303
Existing law provides that the covenants' and restrictions contained in
a common interest development's (CID)2 declaration 3 or governing
documents, 4 may be enforced as equitable servitudes5 by any owner of
a separate interest 6 or by the association,7 unless the covenants are
unreasonable.8 Chapter 303 provides that before an association, owner, or
member of an interest in a CID may file a civil action seeking relief 9
relating to the enforcement of provisions contained in the governing
documents of the CID, the party must submit its dispute to alternative

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1460 (West 1982) (defining "covenants running with the land" as covenants
which pass with the land and bind the assignees as if they had entered into the covenants personally); 6 HARRY
D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 2d § 18:40 (1989) (defining covenant as a promise

to do or refrain from doing a specific act).
2.
See CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1351(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining common interest development as a
community apartment project, a condominium project, a planned development, or a stock cooperative); id. §
1351(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining community apartment project); id. § 1351(0 (West Supp. 1993) (defining
condominium project); id. § 1351(k) (West Supp. 1993) (defining planned development); id. § 1351(m) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining stock cooperative). See generally 7 MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, § 22:10 (discussing
common attributes of all common interest developments).
3.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(h) (West Supp. 1993) (defining declaration as the document which
contains the information required by California Civil Code § 1353); id. § 1353 (West Supp. 1993) (listing the
required contents of the declaration).
4.
See id. § 1351(j) (West Supp. 1993) (defining governing documents as the declaration and any other
documents which govern the operation of the common interest development or association).
5.
See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.22, at 485-87 (1984) (discussing
the history, formation, and requirements of equitable servitudes); 7 MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, § 22:5
(discussing the creation of equitable servitudes); see also Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848) (creating
servitudes to be used in the court of equity which did not require the horizontal and vertical privity necessary
in traditional easements).
6.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(1) (West Supp. 1993) (defining separate interest).
7.
See id. § 1351(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining association as a nonprofit corporation or
unincorporated association created for the purpose of managing a common interest development).
8.
Id. § 1354(a) (amended by Chapter 303); see Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 14
Cal. App. 4th 315, 332-33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 308 (1992) (holding that a condominium association could only
enforce covenants, conditions, and restrictions which were reasonable, and that an unreasonable restriction could
not be enforced against a unit owner even if the owner had constructive knowledge of it), rev. denied, 1993 Cal.
LEXIS 3388.
9.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(b) (amended by Chapter 303) (stating that the relief sought may be solely
for declaratory or injunctive relief, or for declaratory or injunctive relief in conjunction with a claim for
monetary damages not exceeding $5,000).
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dispute resolution (ADR),' ° unless the action is filed to prevent the
imminent running of the limitations period." Chapter 303 allows the
party seeking relief to initiate the process by serving 12 on the other party
a Request for Resolution, which includes a brief description of the dispute,
a request for ADR,13 and a notice requiring the receiving party to respond
within thirty days.
Chapter 303 provides that at the time of the filing of the civil action,
the party filing must file along with the complaint, a certificate stating that
the ADR was completed.' 4 Failure to file the certificate is grounds for a
demurrer or a motion to strike, unless one of the other parties to the
dispute refused ADR, preliminary or temporary orders of the court were
necessary, or ADR was not required because of the imminent running of
the limitations period. 15 Once a civil action has been filed, and upon
written stipulation of the parties, the matter may be referred to ADR and
stayed.' 6 Chapter 303 provides that without approval of both parties,
evidence of anything said, admitted, or any documents prepared for ADR,
shall not be admissible in any civil action, nor shall such evidence be
10.
See JOHN J. COUND ET AL.. CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 15, at 123743 (5th ed. 1989) (evaluating
mechanisms of ADR as alternatives to litigation); id. at 1230-32 (discussing the need for ADR mechanism,; and
their differences from the litigation process); see generally SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDINO
IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA (1988) (giving descriptions, examples and cases on litigation, arbitration,
negotiation and mediation).
11.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(b) (amended by Chapter 303); see generally Deane Gardenhome Ass'n v.
Denktas, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816 (1993) (discussing an example of a dispute which lead
to litigation involving the color of paint on the defendant's property). In this case, the cost of repainting the
house was between $1,500-$1,800, yet the attorney's fees and court costs were over $15,000. Id.; SENATE FLOOR
ANALYSIS OF AB 55, at 3 (July 12, 1993) (stating that the intent of this bill is to divert away from the courts
the growing number of minor disputes involving CIDs' covenants and restrictions such as height of fences, color
of paint, number of vehicles, and similar disputes); Fact Sheet from Robyn Boyer Stewart, Legislative
Representative to Senator Bill Lockyer, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 20, 1993) (copy on file
with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that an average two hour ADR hearing costs approximately $500 and is
completed in 90 days, and that litigation pertaining to covenants and restrictions in the governing documents
can cost from $3,000 to well over $90,000, taking from six to twelve months to resolve).
12.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(b) (amended by Chapter 303) (requiring the service of process for the
Request for Resolution to follow the same guidelines for a small claims action); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
116.340 (West Supp. 1993) (outlining the service of process procedure on the defendant in a small claims court
action).
13.
CAL CIV. CODE § 1354(b) (amended by Chapter 303); see id. (requiring that the ADR mu,.t be
completed within 90 days unless there is a written stipulation by both parties to extend).
14.
Id. § 1354(c) (amended by Chapter 303); see id. § 1354(e) (amended by Chapter 303) (stating that
this chapter does not apply to cross-complaints); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10 (West Supp. 1993) (listing
the grounds for a demurrer); id. § 435 (West 1982) (listing requirements for notice of motion to strike a
complaint).
15.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(c) (amended by Chapter 303).
16.
Id. § 1354(d) (amended by Chapter 303); see id. (stating that during the lime of referral, the action
is not subject to rules of timely disposition); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68603 (West Supp. 1993) (listing standards
of timely disposition for civil and criminal actions).

Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25

Property

compelled in any civil action in which testimony or disclosures can be
compelled. 7 Additionally, Chapter 303 provides that in an action, the
18
prevailing party shall be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
A summary of section 1354 of the California Civil Code, requiring
parties to seek ADR in disputes arising from the governing documents of
a CID, must be annually provided to members of an association. 19 The
summary shall include language which states that failure to comply with
this section may result in the loss of the member's right to sue the
association or another member of the association.2 °
MJP

17.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1354(g)-(h) (amended by Chapter 303); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1990
(West 1982); CAL. EvID. CODE § 704 (West 1966); CAL. INS. CODE § 784 (West 1972) (outlining situations
where a person may be compelled to testify at a trial or hearing); CAL. LAB. CODE § 65 (Vest 1989) (stating
that records of arbitration and mediation of labor disputes are to remain confidential); cf. CAL. EVID. CODE §
1152.5 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that without consent of all persons involved, evidence of anything said or
of any admission made in the course of a mediation, is not admissible in evidence, and may not be compelled
as evidence).
18.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(f) (amended by Chapter 303); see id. (stating that the court may consider
a party's refusal to participate in ADR prior to filing of the action when determining fees and costs); id. § 1717
(West Supp. 1993) (allowing for the award of attorney's fees and costs in contract actions); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1032(b) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that except as otherwise provided by statute, a prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding); id. § 1032(a)(4) (defining prevailing
party); id. § 1033(a)(10) (Vest Supp. 1993) (allowing attorney's fees as part of allowable costs); id. § 1033.5
(West Supp. 1993) (outlining the items allowable as costs); CAL. R. CT. 26(a), (c) (allowing a prevailing party
to be awarded costs and outlining the items recoverable as costs in appellate courts); United Services Automobile
Ass'n v. Dalrymple, 232 Cal. App. 3d 182, 187, 283 Cal. Rptr. 330, 332 (1991) (stating that in the absence of
an established exception, each party bears its own counsel fees); Nielson v. Stumbos, 226 Cal. App. 3d 301,305,
276 Cal. Rptr. 272, 274-75 (1990) (stating that where a statute refers to an award of "costs and attorney's fees",
attorney's fees are an item and component of the costs to be awarded and are allowable as costs under California
Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(10)); Braun v. City of Taft, 154 Cal. App. 3d 332, 348, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654,
663 (1984) (stating that generally, attorney fees are not allowed unless they are specifically authorized by
agreement or statute); see generally 7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CaliforniaProcedure,§§
84-126 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the prevailing party's right to costs, items allowable as costs,
and procedures for obtaining costs); id. § 127 (discussing the bases for an award of attorney's fees).
19.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1354(i) (amended by Chapter 303); see id. § 1365 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring
the distribution of a pro forma operating budget yearly to members of the association).
20.
Id. § 1354(i) (amended by Chapter 303).
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Property; compensation to displaced persons
Government Code § 7262.5 (new); § 7260 (amended).
AB 1257 (Friedman, B.); 1993 STAT. Ch. 851
Existing law requires a public entity' to provide compensation and
advisory services 2 to any person,3 business, 4 or farm operation, 5 that is
displaced because of the acquisition of real property for a public use.6

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(a) (amended by Chapter 851) (defining public entity as including the
state, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and
any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state or any entity acting on behalf of these agencies
when acquiring real property).
2.
See id. § 7261 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the public entity to provide aid, including local
relocation advising assistance offices, to assist in obtaining replacement facilities for relocation of per.ons,
businesses or farm operations).
3.
See id. § 7260(b) (amended by Chapter 851) (defining person as any individual, partners;hip,
corporation, or association).
4.
See id. § 7260(d) (amended by Chapter 851) (defining business).
5.
See id. § 7260(e) (amended by Chapter 851) (defining farm operation as any activity conducted solely
or primarily for the production of one or more agricultural products or commodities for sale or home use, and
customarily producing these products or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of contributing
materially to the operator's support).
6.
Id. § 7262 (West Supp. 1993); see id. § 7260(g) (amended by Chapter 351) (defining public ue as
a use for which real property may be acquired by eminent domain); id. § 7260.5 (West Supp. 1993) (stating
legislative findings and intentions in minimizing the adverse impact of displacement caused by programs or
projects undertaken by public entities); id. § 7262 (West Supp. 1993) (outlining compensation to persons,
businesses or farm operations for moving expenses, losses of tangible personal property, expense!, in searching
for replacement property, and expenses necessary to reestablish a displaced farm or business on a new site);
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984) (holding that an act to regulate a land oligopoly
problem was within the police power of the Hawaii Land Reform Act); Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,
255 (1934) (stating that compensation of taken property is the market value, which is measured by considering
the highest and most profitable use of the land in the reasonable future); Superior Strut & Hanger Co. v. Port
of Oakland, 72 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993-94, 140 Cal. Rptr. 515, 517-18 (1977) (holding that an actual exercise
of eminent domain is not a prerequisite to payment of relocation expenses, but it is only required that property
be acquired for public use); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TIlE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 10745 (1985) (discussing the Police Powers of government to take private land for public
uses); id. at 161-80 (discussing the public use requirement); id. at 181-94 (discussing market value compensation
for taken property); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 114243 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the
sources and rationale behind the powers of eminent domain); JULIUS L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN,
NIcHOis': THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.03 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the construction and amendments
of the Model Eminent Domain Code); id. § 14A.02(4)(a) (discussing the common law views of the rights of
displaced persons upon the taking of the entire leasehold); id. § 14A.02(6) (discussing the costs of obtaining new
premises and the substitution theory of putting the displaced person in the same situation he was in before the
taking); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1988) (stating Congressional declarations of findings and policies to provide fair
and uniform relocation assistance to displaced persons); id. § 4622 (1988) (outlining expenses which are
compensated when displacing a person, business or farm operation); Moorer v. Department of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 561 F.2d 175, 178-79 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act was intended to benefit those displaced by public agencies, and to benefit individuals
who were not willing sellers). See generally Catherine R. Lazuran, Annotation, Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 33 A.L.R. Fed. 9, at §§ 12-24 (1977 & Supp. 1993)
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Chapter 851 changes the definition of displaced persons by adding
occupants of residential hotels 7 and occupants of employee housing8 as
residential tenants who can be displaced as a result of rehabilitation,
demolition, or other displacing activity prescribed under a program or
project of the public entity. 9
Chapter 851 also adds to the definition of persons who are not

considered displaced persons, persons who are temporarily displaced for
not more than 180 days, and who are offered the occupancy of a
comparable replacement unitl0 located within the same apartment
complex." Chapter 851 requires that these people must also be: (1)
Provided with all other financial benefits and services otherwise required
for a displaced person; and (2) offered the right to return to that person's
original unit with a specified rent.' 2 The temporary unit provided to the
displaced person may not be unreasonably impacted by the effects of the

(discussing relocation assistance which may be granted under the Federal Real Property Acquisition Policies);
James Timothy Payne, Annotation, Validity Constnction, andApplication of State Relocation Assistance Laws,
49 A.L.R.4th 491 at §§ 27-33 (1986 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the specific relocation costs allowed); id. §§ 5457 (discussing relocation benefits in eminent domain proceedings); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Supreme
Court's Views as to What Constitutes "Taking" Within Meaning of Fifth Amendnent's ProhibitionAgainst
Taking of Private Propertyfor Public Use Without Just Compensation, 89 L. Ed. 2d 977 at §§ 3-5 (1988),
(discussing general principles of eminent domain); id. §§ 6-9 (discussing government action of acquiring
property).
7.
See CAL. H ,Lmii & SAFErY CODE § 50669(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining residential hotels).
8.
See id. § 17008 (West Supp. 1993) (defining employee housing).
9.
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 7260(c)(1)(A)(ii) (amended by Chapter 851); see Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v.
Richmond Redev. Agency, 178 Cal. App. 3d 435, 445, 223 Cal. Rptr. 728, 734 (1986) (holding that a tenant
who holds over without the owner's consent becomes a tenant at sufferance and does not qualify for relocation
benefits as a displaced person); Albright v. State, 101 Cal. App. 3d 14, 19-20, 161 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1979)
(holding that a person who owned a home on rented land which had been acquired by the State through
condemnation was a displaced person entitled to relocation benefits even though he also owned another home);
Baiza v. Southgate Recreation & Park Dist., 59 Cal. App. 3d 669, 674, 130 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (1976) (holding
that a tenant who was offered the opportunity to remain a tenant after the property was condemned, and who
failed to pay rent, lost his status as a displaced person and was not entitled to relocation benefits).
10.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(i) (amended by Chapter 851) (defining comparable replacement
dwelling).
11.
Id. § 7260(c)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 851); see id. § 7260(c)(3)(B)(i) (amended by Chapter 85 1)
(defining "apartment complex" as four or more residential rental units subject to common ownership and
financing that are also located on the same or contiguous parcels); Smith v. Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100, 106
(M.D. Tenn. 1974) (stating that condemnees could not assert that the city had failed to provide them with
relocation assistance since the condemnees had refused relocation assistance offered them). See generally
ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 1257, at 2 (June 1, 1993) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 851 is to
reduce the potential costs for relocation assistance payments to temporarily displaced tenants in order to
encourage the rehabilitation of approximately 20,000 publicly subsidized or low-income units in need of
rehabilitation).
12.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7260(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii) (amended by Chapter 851).
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construction, and the3 property must be a qualified affordable housing
preservation project.'
MJP

Property; marital property dissolution
Civil Code §§ 4800.10, 4800.11 (amended and repealed); Family
Code §§ 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112 (new); §§ 2100, 2101, 2102,
2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2122, 2125, 2127 (amended); § 2109
(amended and renumbered).
AB 1469 (Speier); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1101
(Effective July 27, 1993)
Existing law requires each party in a dissolution of marriage' action,
except by court order upon good cause or by the stipulation of the parties,
to serve upon the other party a preliminary declaration of disclosure which
sets forth the declarant's assets 2 and liabilities,3 and a completed income
and expense declaration 4 within sixty days of service of the petition for
dissolution of marriage.5 Existing law also requires each party to serve
upon the other party a final declaration of disclosure 6 and a current

13.
Id. § 7260(c)(3)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 851); see id. § 7260(c)(3)(B)(ii) (amendLd by Chapter
851) (defining qualified affordable housing preservation project).

1.
See CAL. FAst. CODE § 310 (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (stating that marriages are dissolved by
the death of one of the parties, a judgment of dissolution of marriage, or a judgment of nullity of marriage).
2.
See id. § 2101(a) (amended by Chapter 1101) (stating that assets include, but are not limited to, any
real or personal property of any nature, whether tangible or intangible, and whether currently existing or
contingent).
3.
See id. § 2101(e) (amended by Chapter 1101) (stating that liability includes, but is not limited to, any
debt or obligation, whether currently existing or contingent).
4.
See id. § 2101(d) (amended by Chapter 1101) (stating that expenses include, but are not limited to,
all personal living expenses, but shall not include business related expenses); CAL. R. CT. 1225(b) (West 1993)
(requiring a completed income and expense declaration, and property declaration when requested).
5.
CAL. FAst. CODE § 2104 (amended by Chapter 1101); see id. § 2330 (West Special Pamphlet 1993)
(outlining a petition for dissolution of marriage); see also THE RUTr R GROUP, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE,
Family Law § 1:145 (William P. Hogoboom & Donald B. King eds., 1993) (discussing the procedural
requirements for preparing and exchanging disclosure declarations).
6.
See CAL. FAMi. CODE § 2105(d) (amended by Chapter 1101) (requiring that the final declaration of
disclosure include all material facts and information regarding the characterization of all assets and liabilities,
the valuation of all assets in which the community has interest, the amounts of all obligations on the liabilities
which are community, all material facts and information regarding the earnings, accumulations, and expenses
of each party which are set forth in the income and expense declaration).
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income and expense declaration, executed under penalty of perjury, before
the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of property or support
issues.7

Chapter 1101 provides that existing law will apply to nullification of
marriage and legal separation proceedings. 8 Chapter 1101 also requires
that the parties always exchange preliminary declaration of disclosures, and
deletes the exception allowing the preliminary declaration of disclosure to
be waived by the court upon good cause or by stipulation of the parties.9
Chapter 1101 states that absent good cause, no judgment shall be entered
with respect to the parties' property rights without each party having

7.
Id. § 2105(a) (amended by Chapter 1101); see id. (requiring the final declaration of disclosure and
current income and expense declarations to be filed at least 45 days before the trial date); id. § 2101(c) (amended
by Chapter 1101) (defining earnings and accumulations as including all income, from whatever source derived);
hI re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal. 3d 897, 905, 663 P.2d 187, 191, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (1983) (stating
that because of the fiduciary relationship between the spouses, each spouse has an obligation to inform the other
spouse of the existence of community property assets); Schnabel v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 1089,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63, 70 (1992) (stating that public policy requires the accurate disclosure of information by both
parties in a marital dissolution proceeding); Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1049-50, 177
Cal. Rptr. 82, 84 (1981) (noting that a spouse was not entitled to disclosure of income tax returns of the other
spouse's law corporation and three partnerships for purposes of ascertaining their wealth in a dissolution
proceeding); see also Sorrell Trope, DIVIDING PROPERTY ON DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: AN OVERVIEW 1-11
(Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar 1990) (discussing the methods and techniques used to valuate the assets in divorce
proceedings). See generally Victoria Felton-Collins & Violet Woodhouse, Dividing Equity When Couple Splits,
L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1992, at KI (discussing the division of home equity upon the termination of a marriage);
Walter Price, Arguments are Heard on Faine-as-ProperyClaim, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 8, 1991, at F13 (discussing
whether the fame of one spouse can be considered as property in divorce proceedings); Spouse Entitled to
Business Records in a Divorce, L.A. TIMEs, July 24, 1993, at D6 (stating that the spouse of a business owner
has the right to extensive company financial records during divorce proceedings).
8.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2104(a) (amended by Chapter 1101); see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4400-4458 (West
1982 & Supp. 1993) (discussing marriages which are void or voidable, and thus a nullity); see also THE RUTrTER
GROUP, supra note 5, § 2:10-15 (discussing the advantages of nullity proceedings compared to marital
dissolution); id. § 11:19.7 (stating that prior to Chapter 1101, legal separation proceedings did not have to
conform to declaration of disclosure rules, and normal discovery methods had to be utilized for these
proceedings).
9.
CAL. FAI. CODE §§ 2109, 2110 (enacted by Chapter 1101).
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executed and served a copy of the final declaration of disclosure and
current income and expense declaration.'0
MJP
Property; mobilehome park rules
Civil Code § 798.25.5 (new).
AB 1012 (Bornstein); 1993 STAT. Ch. 889
Existing law provides that a rule or regulation of a mobilehome park'
may be amended by the management z of the park without the consent of
the homeowner.3 Chapter 889 provides that a rule which is unilaterally

10.
Id. § 2106 (amended by Chapter 1101); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 4550 (West Supp. 1993) (outlining
the conditions necessary for the commencement of summary dissolution proceedings); id. § 4800.10(f) (amended
by Chapter 1101); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2107(c) (amended by Chapter 1101) (stating that if a party fails to
produce declarations of disclosure as required by this chapter, they must pay the complying party's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred, in addition to any other remedy provided by law); see also THE RUTTER
GROUP, supra note 5, § 1:130 (stating that for convenience, summary dissolutions should be used for marital
dissolutions where the marriage was of a short duration, involved no minor children, and had relatively minimal
community property); id. § 8:144.7-8 (discussing the two-stage declaration of disclosure requirements under
previous California Civil Code sections); id. § 8:302.2-3 (discussing mandatory declarations of disclosure, and
sanctions for not complying with declaration regulations). See generally CALIFORNIA MARITAL DISSOLUTION
PRACTICE §5.1-20, at 125-40 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar 1981 & Supp. 1991) (discussing summary dissolution
proceedings); JOYCE HENS GREEN ET AL., DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE § 10.01-07 (1986 & Supp. 1992)
(discussing the division of marital property, historically, and under the Uniform Marital Property Act).

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.4 (West 1982) (defining mobilehome park as an area of land
accommodating mobilehomes used for human habitation, and where two or more mobilehome sites are rented,
or held out for rent); id. § 798.3(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining mobilehome as a structure designed for human
habitation and for being moved on a street or highway).
2.
See id. § 798.2 (West 1982) (defining management as the owner of a mobilehome park or an agent
or representative authorized to act on the owner's behalf in connection with matters relating to a tenancy in the
park).
3.
Id. § 798.25 (West Supp. 1993); see id. (regulating amendments of mobilehome park rules and
regulations); id. (stating that to make a rule or regulation without the consent of the homeowners, notice of the
amendment must be sent to the tenant within six months of the change); see also id. § 798.9 (West Supp. 1993)
(defining homeowner as a person who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement); id. §
798.14 (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating that notice must be either delivered personally to the homeowner orldeposited
in the United States mail, addressed to the homeowner at his or her site within the mobilehome park); cf ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1452(C) (Supp. 1993) (stating that a park owner may amend rules, which are not unfair
or deceptive, if the owner furnishes the changes to all mobilehome tenants 30 days before they become
effective); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 7015(e) (1989) (allowing a landlord to amend existing rules and
regulations, which will become effective 60 days after the landlord delivers the written notice of the amendments
to the tenant). See generally 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 533(d) (9th cd.
1987) (discussing CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.25).
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adopted by the management, is implemented without the consent of the
homeowners, and purports to deny homeowners their right to a trial by
jury, or requires binding arbitration in disputes between the homeowner
and management, is void and unenforceable. 4

MJP
Property; mobilehome parks
Civil Code §§ 798.3, 798.15, 798.22, 798.55 (amended).
AB 503 (Rainey); 1993 STAT. Ch. 666
3
2
Existing law provides that mobilehome' park rental agreements
must contain a provision specifying that it is the responsibility of the
management 4 to provide physical improvements in the common areas and
maintain them in good working order and condition.5 Chapter 666 requires

CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.25.5 (enacted by Chapter 889); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS
4.
OF AB 1012, at 1, (June 7, 1993) (stating that there is evidence of a statewide trend for mobilehome park
management to include clauses in the rules to limit a homeowner's constitutional right to a jury or to force
binding arbitration, in disputes between the management and homeowners). Proponents feel that tenants might
agree to the provisions of waiving a jury trial or compulsory arbitration because they do not know that they
infringe on their constitutional rights. Id. at 2; see also JDC (America) Corp. v. Amerifirst Fla. Trust Co., 736
F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one
party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts); Dixon v. Prothro, 840 P.2d 491, 496 (Kan. 1992) (stating
that juries have such an important place in our society and history, that any attempt to curtail the right to a jury
trial should be examined with the utmost care); Barazzotto v. Intelligent Sys., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the only way to reconcile compulsory arbitration with the constitutional right to a
jury trial is to allow the party with the right to the jury trial to demand a jury trial de novo following the
arbitration result); cf FA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring mobilehome owners and
management to attempt to resolve their disputes using nonbinding arbitration to reduce court dockets and spare
the parties the cost of litigation).

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.3(a) (amended by Chapter 666) (defining mobilehome).
1.
See id. § 798.4 (West 1982) (defining mobilehome park as an area of land where two or more
2.
mobilehomes are rented).
See id. § 798.8 (West Supp. 1993) (defining rental agreement as an agreement between the
3.
management and the homeowner establishing the terms and conditions of a park tenancy).
See id. § 798.2 (West 1982) (defining management as the owner of a mobilehome park or agent or
4.
representative authorized to act on the management's behalf regarding matters of tenancy).
Id. § 798.15(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 666); see id. § 798.15(g) (amended by Chapter 666)
5.
(requiring the rental agreement to contain a provision stating that the management can charge a reasonable fee
for maintenance of the land upon which the mobile home is situated); Duncan v. United States, 734 F. Supp.
824, 826 (N.D.III. 1990) (holding that a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep common areas
in a reasonably safe condition); Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 499, 723 P.2d 573,
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Properly

that the mobilehome park rental agreement specify that the management
shall have a reasonable time, after management knows or should have
known, of the sudden or unforeseeable breakdown or deterioration of the
physical improvements, to repair and bring them into good working
order.6
Existing law provides that management must send notice of termination
or refusal to renew tenancy at least 60 days before terminating or refusing
to renew tenancy to a homeowner.7 Under existing law, a copy of this

576, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459 (1986) (comparing a condominium association to a landlord, and stating that a
condominium association has the duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining common areas); Yazzolino v.
Jones, 153 Cal. App. 2d 626, 632, 315 P.2d 107, 111 (1957) (holding that a landlord has a duty to use ordinary
care to keep portions of the premises over which control is retained, such as common areas, in a safe condition);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360 (1965) (stating that a landlord is liable for injuries that occur to
tenants in common areas due to dangerous conditions which the landlord could have discovered by the usw of
ordinary care); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 440 (5th ed.

1984) (discussing the affirmative obligation of the landlord to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and
repairing common areas). The obligation is one of reasonable care, and the landlord is not liable where no iniury
was reasonably anticipated or the condition was not discoverable by a reasonable inspection. Id. at 441; see also
ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:4 (1980) (discussing the tort liability

for injuries sustained on premises controlled by the landlord); Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort
Liabilit of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv. 99, 102-3 (1982) (discussing the duty of the landlord to control
common areas as an exception to the traditional law of caveat emptor); Christy E. Harris, Project, Special Project
on Landlord-Tenant Law in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals: The Duty of a Modern Landlord to
Protect His Tenantsfrom Crime, 29 HOW. L.J. 149, 154 (1986) (discussing the duty of the landlord to protect
tenants from third party criminal activities arising from historical landlord duties).
6.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 798.15(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 666); see id. § 798.15(d) (amended by Chapter
666) (stating that a reasonable period of time is 'as soon as possible' in situations affecting a health or safety
condition, and shall not exceed 30 days in any other case); id. § 798.84(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that no
action may be brought based on management's failure to maintain physical improvements in the common areas
in good working order or condition unless the landlord has been given at least a 30 day notice of the intended
action); Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 468, 698 P.2d 116, 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 222 (1985) (stating
that the purchaser of rental property is expected to inspect the premises to determine whether they are safe);
Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 174, 18 P. 260, 261 (1888) (stating that a landlord with a covenant to repair, must
do so within a reasonable time); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 884, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268 (1961)
(holding that a covenant to maintain leased premises obligates the landlord to repair only within a reasonable
time after receiving notice from the tenant); see also Proffer v. Randall, 755 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that the tenant is under an obligation to give notice to the landlord of any defect not known to
the landlord, and to allow a reasonable time for repairs); Appleby v. Webb, 588 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y. App,
Div. 1992) (holding that in order for a landlord to be held liable for a defective condition upon a premises, lie
must have had actual or constructive notice of the condition for a sufficient amount of time so that, in the
exercise of reasonable care, he should have corrected it); Annotation, Statute Requiring Property to be Kept in
Good Repair as Affecting Landlord's Liability for PersonalInjury to Tenant or His Privies, 17 A.L.R.2d 704,
722 (1951) (stating that a landlord is liable for injuries which occur as a result of a defect, after the landlord has
received actual or constructive notice of the defect and fails to repair it within a reasonable time).
7.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.55(b) (amended by Chapter 666); see id. § 798.9 (West Supp. 1993) (defining
a homeowner as a person who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement); id § 798.55(a)
(amended by Chapter 666) (stating legislative findings on why mobilehome owners are provided with unique
protection from eviction); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1162 (West 1982) (listing the acceptable means of service
of the notice); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (holding flhat
within limits of practicability, notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties to afford
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notice must be sent to the legal owner,' each junior lienholder, 9 and the
registered owner by mail within ten days after notice was sent to the
homeowner.' ° Chapter 666 provides that if the homeowner has not paid
the rent due within three days after the first notice, a second notice must
be sent to the legal owner, each junior lienholder, and the registered owner
by certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, unless the first
notice was sent by these means."
MJP
Property; rent control
Civil Code § 1947.15 (new).
AB 264 (Costa); 1993 STAT. Ch. 843
Existing law requires an owner' who charges rent to a tenant in
excess of the certified lawful rent ceiling, to refund the excess rent to the
tenant upon demand in any city or county which administers a system of
rent controls on the price at which residential units may be offered for rent
or lease. 3 Chapter 843 requires any city or county that administers rent
them due process of law); Adamson Companies v. Zipp, 163 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 10-11, 210 Cal. Rptr. 165,
171-72 (1984) (stating that the Legislature did not intend, nor does the law require, strict adherence to the
procedure of serving notice to non-tenant owners in unlawful detainer of mobilehome actions, so long as the
owner receives notice of termination or refusal to renew tenancy prior to the landlord filing an unlawful detainer
action). The law requires 60 days prior notice of termination or refusal to renew tenancy sent to the homeowner
before an unlawful detainer action. Id.; Palmer v. Agee, 87 Cal. App. 3d 377, 386, 150 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846
(1978) (stating that the 60 day notice to tenants applies exclusively to proceedings for termination of
mobilehome tenancies for nonpayment of rent).
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18005.8 (West Supp. 1993) (defining legal owner as a person
8.
holding a security interest in a mobilehome).
See id. § 18005.3 (West Supp. 1993) (defining junior lienholder as a person, other than a legal owner,
9.
holding a security interest in a mobilehome).
CAL. CiV. CODE § 798.55(b) (amended by Chapter 666).
10.
Id.
11.

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980(b) (West 1985) (defining owner as any person other than the landlord
1.
who has any right, title, or interest in personal property).
See id. § 1980(e) (West 1985) (defining tenant as any paying guest, lessee, or sublessee of any
2.
premises for hire).
Id. § 1947.11 (a) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (stating that if the owner refuses to refund the excess rent,
3.
and if a court determines that the owner willfully or intentionally charged the tenant rent in excess of the
certified lawful rent ceiling, the court shall award the tenant a judgment for the excess amount of rent and may
triple the amount); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1988) (holding that the purpose of a city rent
control ordinance to prevent unreasonable rent increases caused by the city's housing shortage was a legitimate
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control, and which does not include a system of vacancy decontrol, 4 to
include in any calculation of a property owner's net operating expenses,
any expenses and other costs for professional services5 reasonably
incurred 6 in the course of successfully7 pursuing rights under or in
relationship to that ordinance or the rights to a fair retum 8 on the owner's
exercise of the city's police power); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 158, 550 P.2d 1001, 1022,
130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 486 (1976) (holding that rent control is a proper exercise of a local government's police
power if it is reasonably calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the same time provide landlords with a
just and reasonable return on their properties) superseded by statute as stated in City of Santa Monica v.
Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d 153,249 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1988); see also W. DENNIS KEATING, THE RENT CONTROL
DEBATE 57-74 (Paul L. Niebanek, ed., 1985) (discussing the evolution of rent control in California and
alternatives to rent control); PAUL L. NIEBANCK, THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 7-10 (Paul L. Niebanck, ed.,
1985) (discussing the politics and economics of rent control and how the policies of rent control may have added
to the problem of the housing shortages that rent control was designed to end); ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI,
AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 7:1 (1980) (discussing the historical background and purpose
of rent controls); 6 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 147-

54 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992) (discussing regulations of rent); id. at 154 n.5 (noting that the purpose of rent
control is to alleviate hardship due to a shortage of housing, yet noting that many studies show that rent control
leads to a reduction in housing quality and quantity); MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 2955 (Paul L. Niebanck, ed., 1985) (outlining the rent control plans of New York City).
4.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947.15(i)(1) (enacted by Chapter 843) (defining vacancy decontrol as a
system of controls on the price at which residential rental units may be offered for rent or lease which permits
the rent to be increased to its market level, without restriction, each time a vacancy occurs, and reimposes
controls on the price of the rental unit upon rerental); see also Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being
Taken b% the Good Cause Eviction Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 335 (1988) (defining vacancy
decontrol as a process allowing an owner with a vacant rental unit to rent the unit at the market value after a
tenancy has been terminated, but once rented, the unit will again be regulated by rent control provisions fixing
the rental price). The effect of vacancy decontrol is to temporarily exempt a unit from rent control rate
restrictions so that an owner may set the rent at market price. Id.
5.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947.15(b) (enacted by Chapter 843) (stating that professional services fees,
expenses and costs include, but are not limited to, legal, accounting, appraisal, bookkeeping, consulting, property
management or architectural services).
6.
See id. § 1947.15(e) (enacted by Chapter 843) (stating that the determination of the reasonableness
of the expenses, fees or other costs shall be determined by considering: 1) The rate charged for those
professional services in that geographical area; 2) the complexity of the matter; 3) the degree of administrative
burden or judicial burden imposed upon the property owner; 4) the amount of adjustment of rent sought or the
significance of the fights defended and the results obtained; and 5) whether the professional assistance was
reasonably related to the result achieved).
7.
See id. § 1947.15(g) (enacted by Chapter 843) (stating that the rights of a property owner shall be
deemed successfully pursued if the owner obtains an upward adjustment in rents, successfully defends his or her
rights in an administrative proceeding brought by the tenant or local rent board, or prevails in a proceeding,
brought under California Civil Code § 1947.7, concerning certification of maximum lawful rents).
8.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing that the government shall not "take"
private property without just compensation); Cromwell Associates v. Mayor and Council of Newark, 511 A.2d
1273, 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (stating that rent control ordinances must allow a landlord to receive
a just and reasonable return on his investment). See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY
555-56 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the calculation of "fair returns" on rents under rent control programs); 6 HARRY
D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE at 154-62 (stating that a landlord
is entitled to a "fair and reasonable" return on the rental property); id. at 154 n. 5 (discussing the objective of
rent control to obtain a market equilibrium level rent to assure a return on the landlord's investment, but not to
allow him to take advantage of housing shortages); Dwight C. Hirsh, IV, Note, Yee 1'. Cite of Escondido: A
Rejection of the Ninth Circuit's Unique PhysicalTakings Theory Opensthe Gatesfor Mobilehoine Park Owners'
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property. 9 If it is determined that the landlord's petition to pursue these
rights is wholly without merit, the tenant shall be awarded a reduction in
rent to compensate for the reasonable costs of attorneys or consultants
retained to defend against the petition brought by the landlord."0
Chapter 843 provides that all expenses, reasonably incurred by a
property owner in an administrative proceeding to successfully pursue
rights under rent control ordinances, are included in the total net operating
expenses used to determine the fair return to the owner of the property."1
Chapter 843 provides that the reasonable fees incurred by the property
owner in successfully obtaining a judicial reversal of an adverse
administrative decision regarding the upward adjustment of rents, shall be
assessed against the public agency which issued the adverse administrative
decision.12 If the landlord's appeal of an adverse administrative decision
is frivolous13 or solely to cause unnecessary delay, the public agency

which defended the action shall be awarded its reasonably incurred
expenses in defending the action.14 The ability of a local agency to set its

Regulatory Takings Clause, 24 PAC. L.Jh 1681 (1993) (discussing the history and constitutionality of rent control
law in California).
CAL CIV. CODE § 1947.15(b) (enacted by Chapter 843); see id. § 1947.15(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter
9.
843) (stating that the city may amortize the expenses for a period of five years, except in extraordinary
circumstances when the period may be 8 years, if there is evidence that the expenses will not reoccur annually);
id. § 1947.15(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 843) (stating that the reasonableness of the expenses claimed, the
appropriateness of the amortization period, or an award of an upward adjustment in rents to compensate the
property owner for expenses, shall be made as part of, or immediately following, the decision in the underlying
administrative proceedings); Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d 43, 57, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876, 885
(1991) (stating that the lack of a vacancy decontrol clause in a rent control ordinance does not constitute a taking
without just compensation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1665 (1992); see also EAST PALO ALTO, CAL., ORDINANCE
17-83, § 12 (stating that landlords may petition the Board to raise rents in rent control units so that they can
maintain a positive net operating income, but that attorney's fees and costs incurred in proceedings before the
board are not considered operation expenses); Los ANGELES, CAL., ORDINANCE 152,120, § 151.06(C) (1984)
(stating that a landlord may raise the maximum rent level of specified vacant rental units to any amount upon
re-rental, but after the unit is rented, the rent may not be increased); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE art.
IV, ch. 4, § 4410 (stating that landlords may raise rents on vacant rental units only after obtaining a limited
vacancy increase certificate upon application to the rent board); B.K. Stinshoff, Unusual Alliance Opposes
Change in Rent Law, WEST HOLLYWOOD POST, Sept. 21, 1989, at 1 (discussing the effect that rent increase
provisions on vacant units have had in West Hollywood); B.K. Stinshoff, Rent Control Fears Scaring OffReal
Estate Investors, WEST HOLLYWOOD POST, Feb. 28, 1985, at 14 (discussing the effect that rent control has had
in reducing the value of rental properties in the West Hollywood area).
10.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947.15(h)(1) (enacted by Chapter 843); see id. (stating that the reasonableness
of the costs of the tenant's defense shall be determined by the same factors used to determine the reasonableness
of the landlord's costs for professional services); idL § 1947.15(e) (enacted by Chapter 843) (outlining the factors
used to determine the reasonableness of the landlord's costs for professional services).
11.
Id. § 1947.15(b) (enacted by Chapter 843).
12.
Id. § 1947.15(c) (enacted by Chapter 843).
13.
See id. § 1947.15(h)(2) (enacted by Chapter 843) (defining frivolous as either: 1) Totally and
completely without merit; or 2) for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party).
Id.
14.
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own fair return standards, or to limit other actions under its local rent
control programs, is not affected by Chapter 843.15

MJP

Property; return of security deposits by landlords
Civil Code § 1950.5 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure § 1174
(amended).
SB 444 (Rosenthal); 1993 STAT. Ch. 755
Existing law provides that a landlord' may require a security2 deposit
for a residential rental agreement.3 Prior law provided that within two
weeks after the tenant4 had vacated the premises, the landlord, or his
15.
Id. § 1947.15(j) (enacted by Chapter 843); see id. § 1947.15(f) (enacted by Chapter 843) (stating that
Chapter 843 is not applicable to any mobilehome parks where rent is limited by rent controls).

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980(a) (West 1985) (defining landlord as any operator, keeper, lessor, or
sublessor of any furnished or unfurnished premises for hire, or his agent or successor in interest).
2.
See id. § 1950.5(b) (amended by Chapter 755) (defining security as any payment, fee depo.it, or
charge including an advanced payment in rent, to be used for any purpose including: (1) The compensation of
the landlord for a tenant's default in rent; (2) repair of damages to premises other than wear and tear caused by
the tenant; (3) cleaning the premises at termination of tenancy; and (4) to remedy future defaults of the tenant
in returning, replacing, or restoring personal property); id. § 1950.5(c) (amended by Chapter 755) (stating that
the amount of security demanded by the landlord may not be greater than two times the rent for a non-furnished
residence and three times the rent for a furnished residence).
3.
Id. § 1950.5(a) (amended by Chapter 755); see People v. Parkmerced Co., 198 Cal. App. 3d 683, 692,
244 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1988) (stating that a landlord can only claim security in amounts reasonably necessary
to remedy tenants' defaults, to repair damages to premises caused by tenants, and to refund the difference of the
collected security); see also ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 6:31,
6:34 (1980) (discussing security deposits and the rights and obligations with respect to the return of the deposit);
id. §§ 6:40-6:41 (discussing statutes concerning security deposits); cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-44(b) (Supp.
1992) (requiring that the security deposit not exceed a sum equal to one month's rent); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 582550 (1983) (stating that the security deposit for an unfurnished dwelling is not to exceed one month's rent, and
1 1/2 month's rent for a furnished dwelling); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(b) (1988) (stating that the
maximum security deposit allowed is a sum equal to two month's rent, or $50, whichever is greater). See
generally John P. Bosshardt, Note, Rental Security Deposit in California, 22 HASTiNGS LJ. 1373 (1971)
(discussing rental security deposits in California); Note, Uniform ResidentialLandlordand TenantAct, 15 W.
& MARY L. REv. 845, 875-88 (1974) (discussing security deposits).
4.
See LIBBY F. JESsup, LANDLORD AND TENANT 122 (1974) (defining tenant as one who has the
temporary use and occupancy of real property owned by another, and the duration and terms of that tenancy
usually being fixed by a lease); see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1940(a) (West 1985) (defining persons who hire real
property as persons who hire dwelling units located within this state including tenants, lessees, boarders and
lodgers); id. § 1980(e) (West 1985) (defining tenant as any paying guest, lessee, or sublessee of any premises
for hire).
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successor in interest, was required to provide an itemized statement
indicating the amount of, and the basis for having, security withheld, and
return any remaining portion of the security to the tenant.5 Prior law also
provided that a landlord or a landlord's successor in interest6 could be
subject to damages, not to exceed $200 plus two percent interest on the
security, in addition to actual damages, for a bad faith claim or retention
of the security deposit.7 Chapter 755 provides that a landlord may be
liable for up to $600 statutory damages, in addition to actual damages, for
a bad faith retention of security.8 Chapter 755 also provides that the
landlord has three weeks to return an itemized statement indicating the
basis for, and the amount of, any security received and the disposition of
the security, and shall return any remaining portion of the security to the
tenant. 9
Prior law provided that a successful plaintiff in a forcible entry,' ° or12
forcible or unlawful detainer"t proceeding, upon a showing of malice,
5.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 564, sec. 1, at 1991 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5); see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1950.5(0 (amended by Chapter 755) (requiring the landlord to furnish the tenant within three weeks, the
itemized statement by personal delivery or first class mail); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-12-103(1) (1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-7-34 (Harrison 1991) (allowing one month to provide itemized statements and remaining
portion of security deposit); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7-5-16 (Bums Supp. 1993) (allowing 45 days to return a
security deposit).
6.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1950.5(g) (amended by Chapter 755) (allowing a landlord to transfer his
interest and relieve himself of liability by transferring the portion of the security deposit remaining to the
successor in interest, or return the portions to the tenant).
7.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 564, see. 1, at 1991 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 1950.5).
8.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1950.5(k) (amended by Chapter 755); see Kirkland v. Allen, 678 P.2d 568, 571-72
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that when a landlord deliberately fails to return the security deposit following
the tenant's notice, such retention is "willful" under the statute entitling tenant to treble damages for willful
retention of a security deposit); Beckett v. Olson, 707 P.2d 635, 637 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a
landlord's failure to return a security deposit to a former tenant within 30 days of termination of tenancy and
redelivery of possession mandated an award to the former tenant of twice the amount of the security deposit);
cf GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-35(c) (Harrison 1991) (allowing damages of three times the security sum improperly
withheld, plus reasonable attorney's fees).
9.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1950.5(f) (amended by Chapter 755); see Consumers Distrib. Co. Ltd. v. Hermann,
812 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Nev. 1991) (stating that a landlord must provide the tenant with an accounting when the
landlord withholds funds, whether or not the lease contract provided that the tenant was entitled to an
accounting); cf. IDAHO CODE § 6-321 (1990) (requiring the itemized letter and remaining portion of the security
deposit to be returned within 21 days if there is no other time fixed in the agreement between the parties).
10.
See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 1159 (West 1982) (defining forcible entry as breaking open doors,
windows, or other parts of a house; or using any kind of violence to enter into real property; or, after entering
peaceably upon real property, turn out by force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession); Karp v.
Margolis, 159 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 323 P.2d 557, 559 (1958) (stating that forcible entry is not confined to cases
where a fight takes place, or physical force or restraint is used, or where there are threats of physical harm, and
no flat breach of the peace is necessary).
11.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1160 (West 1982) (defining forcible detainer as keeping possession of
real property by force or threats of violence, whether the property was acquired peaceably or otherwise); id. §
1161 (West 1982) (stating that a tenant guilty of unlawful detainer if he remains after the expiration of the lease
term, keeps possession after a default in rent, fails to perform conditions of the lease, commits waste on the
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could be awarded either the damages and rent found due, or punitive

damages 13 of up to three times the amount of damages and rent found
due. 14 Chapter 755 revises this provision to provide instead that the
plaintiff may be awarded statutory damages
of up to $600, or actual
15
both.
or
due,
found
rent
including
damages,
MJP

property, or fails to quit the premises after notice).
12.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §7(4) (West 1988) (defining malice and maliciously as a wish to vex, annoy,
or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of
law).
13.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that exemplary damages may be recovered
for the sake of example and punishment where there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice).
14.
1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 797, sec. 3, at 2576 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174); see Fifth &
Broadway Partnership v. Kimny, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d 195, 204, 162 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (1988) (holding that
in an unlawful detainer action, treble damages are awarded properly against a defendant if malice is pleaded and
proved); Karp, 159 Cal. App. 2d at 76, 323 P.2d at 561 (stating that in a forcible detainer action, where plaintiffs
established forcible entry and detainer, but failed to establish actual damages, court could only award plaintiffs
nominal damages and treble that amount); see also Love v. Monarch Apartments, 771 P.2d 79, 82 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (stating that the penalty for wrongful withholding of the security deposit does not depend on the
landlord's good or bad faith, and that statutory damages are automatic); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 679
(Utah 1992) (holding that forcible entry and detainer provisions make it mandatory for the court to award treble
damages to lessees once it has been determined that the lessor waived his or her only defense).
15.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174(b) (amended by Chapter 755); see Hudec v. Robertson, 210 Cal. App.
3d 1156, 1163, 258 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 (1989) (stating that if the landlord prevails in an unlawful delainer
action, only damages which resulted from the unlawful detention and accrued during that time are proper);
Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 1069-71, 241 Cal. Rptr. 487, 508-09
(1988) (stating that the measure of damages to which a landlord is entitled for unlawful detainer i-, the
reasonable rental value of the property); Adler v. Elphick, 184 Cal. App. 3d 642, 649, 229 Cal. Rptr, 254, 259
(1986) (holding that, in an unlawful detainer action, the damages for wrongful possession need not be limited
to the controlled rent level required by municipal rent control ordinance for subject property); Gray v. Whitmore,
17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 912 (1971) (stating that the judgment for damages and the rent found
due in an unlawful detainer action, are merely incidental to the main objective of recovering possession of the
property); see also Grombone v. Krekel, 754 P.2d 777,780 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that one who prevails
in a forcible entry and detainer action is entitled only to recover possession, damages, reasonable attorney fees,
and costs). The amount of damages that the plaintiff may recover in the unlawful detainer action is the
reasonable rental value of the premises for the period. Id. See generally CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT PRACTICE §§ 7.1-7.221 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar 1986 & Supp. 1992) (discussing unlawful
detainer actions).
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Property; tax or assessment liens
Revenue and Taxation Code § 2192.2 (new); §§ 2192.1, 4703
(amended).
AB 1498 (Campbell); 1993 STAT. Oh. 853
(Effective October 5, 1993)
Existing law provides that every tax or assessment declared to be a
lien' on real property has priority over all other liens.2 Chapter 853 sets
forth several examples of liens and assessments over which a property tax
lien has priority Chapter 853 also declares that proceeds from the sale
of real property upon which taxes are due must be transmitted to the

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2872 (West 1993) (defining lien as a charge imposed upon property, in some
mode other than by a transfer in trust, by which it is made security for the performance of an act); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1180 (West 1982) (defining lien as a charge imposed upon specific property by which it is made
security for an act); see also Thompson v. Clark, 6 Cal. 2d 285, 300, 57 P.2d 490, 498 (1936) (explaining that
it is not essential that one have an immediate right of foreclosure in order for a lien to exist); East Bay Mun.
Util. Dist. v. Garrisson, 191 Cal. 680, 692, 218 P. 43, 47 (1923) (asserting that a tax lien is no different than
other varieties of liens because it rests upon an obligation to do the act which its attachment to the property
secures).

2.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2192.1 (amended by Chapter 853); see id. § 2187 (West 1987) (stating
that every tax on real property is a lien against the property assessed); id. §§ 2188-2189.7 (West 1987 & Supp.
1993) (listing improvements, condominiums, leased premises, planned developments and projects, time-share
projects, personal property, or floating homes as subject to assessment, tax, or lien); see also T.M. Cobb Co.
v. Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. 3d 606, 619, 547 P.2d 431, 439, 128 Cal. Rptr. 655, 663 (1976) (stating that
tax liens are not by their own force superior to prior private liens); Bradbury v. Kaiser, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1257,
1260, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 326-27 (1992) (holding that a perfected judgment lien had priority over a state tax
lien on personal property because the judgment creditor perfected its lien prior to the time the Franchise Tax
Board filed its notice of a tax lien); cf. NEv. REv. STAT. § 360.480 (1991) (giving priority to a recorded lien
when attached prior to the date the amount due in taxes became a lien); OR. REV. STAT. § 311.405(2) (1993)
(stating that no tax lien shall be voided or impaired); TEx. TAx CODE AlN. § 32.05 (Vernon 1992) (giving tax
liens priority over all other liens no matter when the attachment occurred); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 247 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding that, under California law, a tax lien does not have
priority over pre-existing contract liens unless the legislative enactment creating the tax lien has given it priority).
See generally Diversified Credit Corp. v. Couch, 669 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Colo. 1983) (explaining that the
legislature may enact legislation imposing a tax lien on real property and give such a lien priority over other
liens); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Hagerstown v. Shlossberg, 507 A.2d 172, 182 (Md. 1986) (stating
that when the statute clearly provides for tax liens to have priority over other liens, the tax lien is accorded such
priority over preceding liens including perfected security interests); Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southern
Parts Imports, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. 1991) (holding that city tax liens had priority over a perfected
security interest in the same property), affid in part, rev'd in part, 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991).
3.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2192.1 (amended by Chapter 853); see id. (providing recognizance, deed,
judgment, debt, and obligation as an incomplete list of examples over which tax or assessment liens have
priority).

Selected 1993 Legislation

Property

officer responsible for the collection of those
taxes and assessments, and
4
applied to those taxes and assessments due.
JCA/DMB

4.
Id. § 2192.2 (enacted by Chapter 853); see id. (exempting tax sales from sales subject to Chapter 853
and including sales conducted by judicial process or other officers).
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